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Abstract: Thrift was not the cause of the Industrial Revolution or its astonishing 
follow on.  For one thing, every human society must practice thrift, and pre-industrial 
Europe, with its low yield-seed ratios, did so on a big scale.  British thrift during the 
Industrial Revolution, for another, was rather below the European average. And for still 
another, savings is elastically supplied, by credit expansion for example (as Schumpeter 
observed).  Attributing growth to investment, therefore, resembles attributing 
Shakespeare’s plays to the Roman alphabet: “necessary” in a reduced sense, but in fact an 
assumed background, not the cause in any useful sense.  Certainly Europeans did not 
develop unusual greed, and the Catholics---in a society of bourgeois dignity and liberty---
did as well as the Protestants (in Amsterdam, for example).  Ben Franklin, for example, was 
not (as D. H. Lawrence portrayed him in a humorless reading of this most humorous man) 
“dry and utilitarian.”  If capitalism accumulates “endlessly,” as many say, one wonder why 
Franklin give up accumulating at age 42.  The evidence also does not support Marx’s notion 
of an “original accumulation of capital.”  Saving and investment must be used when they 
are made, or they depreciate.  They cannot accumulate from an age of piracy to an age of 
industry.  Yet modern growth theory, unhappily, reinstates as initiating the theory of stages 
and, especially, capital accumulation.  They are not initiating, whether in physical or human 
capital.  Innovation 1700-2010 pushed the marginal product of all capitals steadily out, and 
the physical and human capital followed.
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Chapter 11:
It Didn’t Happen Because of Thrift
How, then?  How and why did the first Industrial Revolution happen, with 
its astonishing follow-on in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries?  In this book we 
specialize in widely believed explanations that don’t work very well.  One widely 
believed explanation is thrift.
The word "thrift" in English is still used as late as John Bunyan to mean 
simply "wealth" or "profit," deriving from the verb "thrive" as "gift" from "give" and 
"drift" from "drive" (the derivation was still vibrant in 1785 to a scholarly poet like 
William Cowper, who laments the working poor in The Task [17 ; Book IV],“With all 
this thrift they thrive not”).  But its sense 3 in the Oxford English Dictionary is our 
modern one, dating significantly from the sixteenth century: "so I will if none of my 
sons be thrifty" (1526); "food is never found to be so pleasant . . . as when . . . thrift 
has pinched afore" (1553).  
The modern "thrift," sense 3, can be viewed as a mix of the cardinal virtues of 
temperance and of prudence in things economic.  Temperance is the cardinal virtue 
of self-command facing temptation.  Lead me not into temptation.  Prudence, by 
contrast, is the cardinal virtue of practical wisdom.  Give us this day [a way to make 
prudently and laboriously for ourselves] our daily bread.  It is reason, know-how, 
savoir faire, rationality, getting allocation right.  Prudence lacking temperance does 
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not in fact do what it knows it should thriftily do.  Temperance lacking prudence, on 
the other hand, does not know in practice what to do.  A prudent housewife in the 
"Ladder to Thrift," as the English agricultural rhymester Thomas Tusser put it in 
1580, "makes provision skillfully."1  Without being full of skill, that is, prudent, she 
does not know how to be thrifty in saving tallow for candles or laying up salt 
mutton for Eastertide.  
Prudent temperance has in a sense no history, because it happens by necessity 
in every human society.  The Hebrew bible, for example, speaks of thrift, though not 
very often, usually associating it with diligence: "The sluggard will not plough in the 
autumn by reason of the cold; therefore shall he beg in [the] harvest, and have 
nothing"; "Seest thou a man diligent in his business?  He shall stand before kings" 
(Proverbs 20:4; 22:29).  Jesus of Nazareth and his tradition used parables of thrift to 
point to another world, though again the parables of thrift are balanced by parables 
of liberality, such as changing water into wine to keep the party going.  "Eat and 
drink," advises the Koran, "but do not be wasteful, for God does not like the 
prodigals" (7:31).  In the Koran, as in the Jewish and Christians books, thrift is not a 
major theme.
Of course other faiths than the Abrahamic admire on occasion a prudent 
thrift.  The Four Noble Truths of Buddhism, to be sure, recommend that life's sorrow 
can be dissolved by the ending of desire, in which case advice to be thrifty would be 
somewhat lacking in point.  Be "thrifty" with your modest daily bread in your 
1   Tusser 1588, p. 13.  
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monk’s cell?   Buddhism is similar in this respect to Greek and Roman stoicism, 
which advocated devaluing this world's lot, an inspiration early and late to 
Christian saints of thriftiness.  But Buddhism allows for prudent busy-ness, too.  The 
"Admonition to Singâla" is in the Buddhist canon "the longest single passage . . . 
devoted to lay morality."2  Buddha promises the businessman that he will “make 
money like a bee” if he is wise and moral: 
Such a man makes his pile
    As an anthill, gradually.
And then it counsels an astounding abstemiousness far beyond that contemplated 
even in Max Weber’s worldly asceticism:
He should divide
His money in four parts;
    On one part he should live,
With two expand his trade,
    And the fourth he should save
Against a rainy day.
The rate of savings recommended is fully 75 percent—though with no allowance for 
charity, which made Buddhist commentators on the text uneasy.  
In England the thirteenth-century writers of advice books to Norman-English 
landowners start with a little bit on thrift and then go on to the prudent details of 
managing an agricultural estate.  The third paragraph of The Husbandry by Walter of 
Henley, after a bow in the second paragraph to the sufferings of Jesus, prays "that 
2   Introduction by A. L. Basham, p. 120, to the passage in Embree, ed., Sources of Indian Tradition, V o l .  I.   The  
pass a g e  be l o w  is   D g h a  N i k y a  3.182 f f .,  re p r i n t e d  p.  123.ī ā
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according to what your lands be worth yearly . . . you order your life, and no higher 
at all."3  And then in the same vein for five more paragraphs.  The anonymous 
Seneschaucy, written like Walter in Norman French in the late thirteenth century, 
instructs the lord's chief steward "to see that there is no extravagance. . . on any 
manor . . . . and to reduce all unnecessary expenditure. . . which shows no profit. . . . 
About this it is said: foolish spending brings no gain."4  The passage deprecates "the 
practices without prudence or reason" (lez maners saunz pru e reyson).  So much for a 
rise of prudence, reason, rationality, Calvinist asceticism, and thrift three or four 
centuries later.  From the camps of the !Kung to the lofts of Chicago, humans need to 
live within their incomes, being by their own lights "thrifty."  
The prehistory of thrift, in other words, extends back to the Garden of Eden. 
It is laid down for example in our genes.  A proto-man who could not gain weight 
thriftily in feast times would suffer in famine and leave fewer children, and 
therefore his descendent in a prosperous modern society needs irritatingly to watch 
his weight.  Prudent temperance does not require a stoic or monkish or Singâla 
abstemiousness.  A ploughman burning 3000 calories a day had better get them 
somehow.  One should be thrifty in eating, says Tusser, but not to the point of 
denying our prudent human solidarity:
Each day to be feasted—what husbandry worse!
Each day for to feast is as ill for the purse.
Yet measurely feasting with neighbors among
3   Walter, late thirteenth century, in Oschinsky 1971, p. 309. 
4   Senechaucy, late thirteenth century, in Oschinsky 1971, p. 269.  
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Shall make thee beloved, and live the more long.5 
And so too actual luxury, the opposite of thrift.  "Depend on it, sir," said 
Samuel Johnson in 1778, "every state of society is as luxurious as it can be.  Men 
always take the best they can get," in lace or food or education.6  Marx noted cannily 
that "when a certain stage of development has been reached, a conventional degree 
of prodigality, which is also an exhibition of wealth, and consequently a source of 
credit, becomes a business necessity. . . .  Luxury enters into capital's expenses of 
representation."7  It sounds plausible enough.  Otherwise it would be hard to explain 
the high quality of lace on the collars of black-clad Dutch merchants in paintings of 
the seventeenth century, or indeed the Dutch market for the paintings in their 
hundreds of thousands that reflected back in oily richness the merchants and their 
world.
The average English and American-English person from the sixteenth 
through the eighteenth century, then, surely practiced thrift.  But this did not 
distinguish her from the average English or American-English person before or 
after, or for that matter from the average person anywhere on Earth since the Fall. 
“’My other piece of advice, Copperfield,’ said Mr. Micawber, ‘you know.  Annual 
income twenty pounds, annual expenditure nineteen nineteen and six, result 
happiness. Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure twenty pounds 
ought and six, result misery.’ . . .  To make his example the more impressive, Mr. 
5   Tusser 1588, p. 18.
6   Boswell 1791, April 14, 1778 (vol. 2, p. 203), quoted in Mathias, p. 302.
7   Marx 1867, Chp. 24, Sec. 3, p. 651.
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Micawber drank a glass of punch with an air of great enjoyment and satisfaction, 
and whistled the College Hornpipe.  I did not fail to assure him that I would store 
these precepts in my mind, though indeed I had no need to do so, for, at the time, 
they affected me visibly."8
Thrift in the sense of spending exactly what one earns is indeed forced by 
accounting.  Not having manna from heaven or an outside Santa Claus, the world 
must get along on what it gets.  The getting and spending must happen if the free 
gifts of nature such as sunlight are to be of any use.  If we do not at least hunt or 
gather, we do not eat.  The world's income from the effort must equal to the last 
sixpence the world's expenditure, "expenditure" understood to include investment 
goods.  So too Mr. Micawber.  If he spends more than he earns he must depend on 
something turning up, such as a loan or a gift or an inheritance.  He draws down his 
credit.  In the meantime his transfers from his diminishing balance sheet—what he 
owns and owes—pays to the last sixpence for his glass of punch and his house rent.  
Thrift in the sense of spending less than one earns and thereby accumulating 
investments is again a matter of accounting.  You must allocate everything you earn 
somehow, to bread or bonds or house-building.  If you can resist consuming soft 
drinks and other immediate consumption goods, "abstaining from consumption" in 
the economist's useful way of putting it, you necessarily save.  That is, you add to 
your bank account or to your investment in education or in battleships.  But of 
8   Dickens, David Copperfield, 1849-50, Chapter 12.
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course you can allocate foolishly or well, to bombs or to college educations, to 
glasses of punch or to a savings account.
There is nothing modern about such accounting.  It comes with life and the 
first law of thermodynamics, in the Kalahari or in Kansas City.  In particular the pre-
industrial European world contrasted with modern times needed urgently to abstain 
from consumption, "consumption" understood as immediate expenditures that are 
not investments in some future.  Yields of rye or barley or wheat per unit of seed 
planted in medieval and early modern agriculture were extremely low: only 3 or 4—
they are 50 or so now for wheat, and 800 for maize.  (In monsoon Asia the flooding 
rains allow the cultivation of rice, which has always had a high yield-seed ratio, with 
the additional benefit that the annual and sometimes biannual flooding fertilized 
and weeded the fields, without plowing.  Rice was introduced by the Muslims into 
Spain and Sicily, and it spread by the fourteenth century into, say, the Po Valley in 
northern Italy.  But it was not raised in the flooding way of the East, and of course it 
was never grown in northern Europe.9)  The low yields forced Europeans in the 
good old days if they did not want to starve next year to refrain from a great deal of 
consumption this year.  That is, one quarter to one third of the grain crop had to go 
back into the ground as seed in the fall or the spring, its fruit to be harvested the 
next September.  It had better.  In an economy in which the grain crop was perhaps 
half of total income, that portion alone of medieval saving implied an aggregate 
saving rate of upwards of ½ times ¼, or 12 percent.  The rate of saving in modern 
9   Goldstone 2009, p. 11.
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industrial economies is seldom above 10 or 20 percent.  No wonder there was little 
savings available for trying out innovations, and the less so because the crops were 
variable.  Medieval life was precarious, and innovation correspondingly dangerous.
The trade in grain was restricted to the parts of Europe served by rivers and 
seas, since overland cartage was enormously expensive when roads were mere 
tracks through mud—and even water transport was usually expensive as a share of 
the price.  The price of wheat in Valencia, Spain in 1450 was 6.7 times the price in 
Lwow, Poland (by 1750 it had fallen to a few percentage points of difference).10 
Therefore local grain storage for local consumption was also high by modern 
standards.  In recent times if the grain crop does poorly in America the market easily 
supplies the deficiency from the other side of the world.  In the late Middle Ages 
some grain did flow from the Midlands to London or from Burgundy to Paris.  But it 
began to flow to Western Europe in large amounts from as far away as Poland only 
gradually in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, by the efforts of thrifty Dutch 
merchants and shipbuilders.  Only in the nineteenth century did it come from as 
distant a clime as Ukraine or, later, North and South America, or finally Australia. 
Until the eighteenth century therefore the grain crops in the narrow market tended 
to fail together.  The potato famine of the 1840s was the last big replay in Europe of a 
sort of undiversified catastrophe commonplace there in the 1540s and more so in the 
1340s.  Grain storage, in other words, amounted to another desperate form of 
saving, crowding out more modern forms of investment.11  In such circumstances 
10   Braudel and Spooner 1967, Figure 23, p. 477.
11   McCloskey and Nash 1984.  Compare Cipolla 1994, p. 89.
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you stored grain in gigantic percentages of current income, or next year you died (in 
West Germanic languages except English, and in English itself until modern English, 
the word cognate with “starve” [for example, German sterven] is the main word for 
“die”).
Such desperate scarcities were broken in the New World of British 
Americans, who ate better than their Old-World cousins within a generation of the 
first settlements.  It was not a remarkable achievement, considering that the rivers 
were full of fish and the woods full of game, and that their English cousins were 
then passing through the worst times for the workingman since the early fourteenth 
century.12  Plentiful land in Massachusetts or Pennsylvania, at any rate on the literal 
frontier, made it unnecessary to save so much in grain, and freed the forced thrift for 
other investments.  
But notice: although the North American English became even in the late 
seventeenth century pretty well off by the poor British standards, and therefore 
freed from using up its savings protecting next year’s grain crop or grain store 
(which anyway was in good part Indian corn with a high ratio of yield to seed), 
British North America was by no means the home of the Industrial Revolution.  It 
was too small, too tempted by agriculture, too far away from a mass of consumers, 
or for that matter too restricted by British mercantilism.  The northeast of the United 
States, like southern Belgium and northern France, was to become a close follower, 
of course, in the 1790s and 1800s.  “Yankee ingenuity” is not a myth, as the quick 
12   Innes 1988, p. 5.
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industrialization of New England was to show.  The North American colonies did 
indeed contain many ingenious inventors willing to get their hands dirty.  Even the 
slave areas were not inventive deserts by any means: look at Jefferson’s ingenuity, 
and the improvement of cotton varieties.  But the leaders of industrialization, from 
the 1760s, were northwest England and lowland Scotland.  These were lands of 
grindingly necessary thrift.  Yields of agriculture were still low—the real 
“agricultural revolution” came finally in the nineteenth century with guano, 
selective breeding, steel plows, cheap water transport, reaping machines, 
commodity exchanges, and clay-pipe drainage, not as used to be thought in the 
eighteenth.  In short, the homeland of the Industrial Revolution was not a place of 
excess savings waiting to be redirected to factories.
The point is that there is no aggregate increase in thrifty savings to explain 
the modern world.  Thrifty saving is not peculiar to the Age of Innovation.  There 
was no rise of thrift or prudence or greed in the childhood of modernity.  Actual 
saving was high before modern times, and did not change much with modern 
innovation.  We were thrifty long before we were mainly urban, and long, long 
before we came to celebrate bourgeois dignity and bourgeois liberty and the creative 
destruction they wrought.  
Looking at thrift in a cheerful way, the starting point used to be said to be 
(according to Max Weber in 1905, for example) a rise of thriftiness among Dutch or 
especially English Puritans.  Marx characterized such classical economic tales, from 
which Weber later took his inspiration, as praise for "that queer saint, that knight of 
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the woeful countenance, the capitalist 'abstainer'."13  We can join him for a moment 
in disbelieving the optimistic tale—noting further, and contrary to his own 
pessimistic version of the same tale, that abstention is universal.  Saving rates in 
Catholic Italy or for that matter Confucian China were not much lower, if lower at 
all, than in Calvinist Massachusetts or Lutheran Germany.  According to recent 
calculations by economic historians, in fact, British investment in physical capital as 
a share of national income was strikingly below the European norm—only 4% in 
1700, as against a norm of 11%, 6% as against 12% in 1760, and 8% against over 12% 
in 1800.14  Britain's investment, though rising before and then during the Industrial 
Revolution, showed less, not more, abstemiousness than in the less advanced 
countries around it.  
The evidence suggests, in other words, that saving depends on investment, 
not the other way round.  You should by all means innovate, with a modest stake 
borrowed from your brother, and then earn the additional savings to reinvest in 
your expanding business.  When in the nineteenth century the rest of Europe started 
to follow Britain into industrialization, its savings rates rose, too.  The rest of 
Europe’s markedly higher rates during the eighteenth century did not cause it then 
to awaken from its medieval slumbers.  Saving was not the constraint.  As the great 
medieval economic historian, M. M. Postan, put it, the constraint was not "the poor 
13   Marx 1867, Chp. 24, Sec. 3, p. 656.
14   Crafts, Leybourne, and Mills 1991, Table 7.2, p. 113; and Feinstein 2003, p. 45.
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potential for saving" but the "extremely limited" character in pre-nineteenth-century 
Europe of "opportunities for productive investment."15 
And innovation, not the sheer piling of productive investments, dominates 
economic growth.  The late Charles Feinstein, who pioneered the estimation of the 
national accounts of Britain back into the mid-nineteenth century and before, 
disagreed.  He argued that “in the earlier stages of economic development, increases 
in the stock of physical capital accounted for a large part of the rise in output per 
man hour; workers were able to produce more because they had more capital to 
work with.”16  Yet such capital-induced rises in output per man hour were limited. 
Doubling the number of horses that a plowman works with does indeed raise wheat 
output per man hour some—though much less than a doubling (it will raise it by 100 
percent [from the doubling of the horses] multiplied by the share of horses in the 
cost of producing wheat, 5 percent perhaps).17  Multiplying the traditional 
equipment in scythes and open drains and barns without innovating does not come 
close to yielding a factor of sixteen.  Innovating in clay-pipe under-drainage and 
plant breeding and forward markets and mechanical reapers and experimental 
stations and diesel tractors and rail car delivery systems and hybrid corn and farm 
cooperatives and chemical herbicides does.  Feinstein knew all this, of course.  He 
was a great and learned economic historian.  He observed that “more recently [than 
15   Postan is thus quoted with approval by another great student of the times, Carlo Cipolla, in Cipolla 1994, 
p. 91.
16   Feinstein 2003, p. 47, from which subsequent quotations are also taken.
17   According to the “marginal productivity theory” developed by economists from the 1890s to the 1940s, the 
share in total costs of an input into production such as horses or land or labor is the farmer’s opinion of the 
percentage change in final output that will come from 1 percent more of the input.  The theory is true if 
farmers face constant returns to scale and have no market power and are in the economist’s sense rational.
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‘the earlier stages of economic development’] . . . advances in the quality of 
equipment have become progressively more important.”  But he could not let go of 
what William Easterly (2001) has called "capital fundamentalism.”  Innovation 
“must be embodied in physical equipment,” Feinstein declared, thus retaining 
investment in the leading role.  (His assertion is true for reaping machines and diesel 
tractors; but it is largely false for organizational innovations such as selective 
breeding.)  The embodiment “made investment and saving . . . crucial to economic 
growth.”  The assertion is true in an accounting sense—no investment, no reaping 
machine.  But it is false in an economic sense.  Attributing the Age of Innovation to 
piling up of capital is like attributing Shakespeare to the English language or to the 
Roman alphabet.  Yes, he needed the language and even the alphabet.  Granted.  But 
is “crucial” the right concept of causation to use? 
The supply of saving to one region such as Lancashire or one country such as 
Britain—even economically dominant Britain around 1840—came at a fixed rate of 
interest, 4 or 6 percent.  The demand for saving was the usefulness of a loan to build 
a barn or a machine, a usefulness that economists call the “marginal product of 
capital.”  Piling brick on brick, or even machine on machine, led to rapidly 
diminishing returns.  Think of a bricklayer oversupplied with bricks, or a 100-acre 
farm with six tractors.  During the 1930s and early 1940s the prospect of diminishing 
returns deeply alarmed such economists such as the American Keynesian at 
Minnesota and Harvard, Alvin Hansen.18  They believed that the technology of 
18   Hansen 1938, 1941, out of Keynes 1937.
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electricity and the automobile was exhausted and that sharply diminishing returns 
to capital were at hand, especially in view of declining birthrates.  People would 
save more than could be profitably invested, the economists believed, and the 
economy would stagnate.  In line with the usual if doubtful claim that spending on 
the War had saved the world’s economy, they believed that 1946 would see a 
renewal of the Great Depression.  But it didn’t.  Stagnationism proved false.19 
Instead, world income per head grew faster from 1950 to 1974 than at any time in 
history, and the liberal countries boomed.  
That is, innovation prevented the return to capital from declining.  Improved 
washing machines and better machine tools and innovative construction techniques 
and a thousand other fruits of resourcefulness made people richer, and incidentally 
kept investment profitable.  In terms an economist will understand, the demand 
curve for capital moved steadily rightward, and has been doing so since the 
eighteenth century.  Tunzelmann argues that in some cases technological change 
works mainly through increasing the capital employed, not only by raising 
productivities.20  (To continue with an audience of economists for a moment, the 
area under the marginal product of capital is of course national income as a whole. 
You can devise models in which saving out of the rising national income becomes 
innovation, which raises income, which raise innovation, in a virtuous spiral.  But 
then you have to explain why such a mechanism only applies to the past two or 
three centuries.  You are back to having to explain the Age of Innovation by 
19   Fogel 2005.
20   Tunzelmann 2003, p. 89.
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something unique to the Age of Innovation.  It can’t be wholly endogenous.21) 
Human resourcefulness that was rare before 1700 and increasingly common 
afterwards made us rich.  Like Shakespeare’s alphabet, the saving and investment 
required to express the innovations were rather easily supplied.  
The ease shows in Feinstein’s own splendid table of investment as a share of 
gross national incomes of a dozen countries, 1770-1969.22  The claim is that 
investment was “crucial” for innovation.  From 1770 to 1839 Britain was the most 
innovative economy on earth, and later it was no slacker, arriving at last among the 
richest countries.  And yet savings/investment rates in Britain were lower than in 
most of the dozen countries, as I noted, and by the late nineteenth century about half 
the savings was invested abroad.  Britain’s rate 1770-1839 was about 7.5 percent, and 
not until the 1960s did it briefly exceed 15 or 16 percent.  The early, 7.5 percent 
figure was exceeded by every one of the other eleven countries in the table, taken 
over the two or three decades in which their figures begin to be available—decades 
which usually corresponding to their entry into industrialization.  It is Feinstein who 
introduces the talk of “stages,” and so there cannot be a complaint that France in the 
1820s and 1830s is not to be compared with Britain earlier: the comparison is at the 
same “stage.”  And setting stage thinking aside, in any given decade across the table 
the British rates are commonly lower than in the other countries.  If investment and 
saving were crucial to economic growth, then Britain with its low rates of 
21   McCloskey 1995.
22   Feinstein 2003, p. 45.  The table stands as a monument to the massive scholarly effort of numerous 
economic historians since Simon Kuznets invented the methods in the 1930s and 1940s.
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investment would not have been the leader in industrialization.  Rates of investment 
and saving rose as a result of innovation.  They did not cause it.
What was indeed “crucial” was the innovation itself, the steam engines and 
the steel ships, the hybrid corn and the agricultural cooperatives.  What was crucial 
was working smarter, not harder, as the South African economist Stanislav du 
Plessis puts it.  Du Plessis is summarizing what all economists and economic 
historians have known since the 1960s—that sheer accumulation of frozen labor in 
capital is not what has made us rich.  Yet in 2003 Feinstein (also by the way a South 
African) was still resisting the finding, part of which he himself had established.  He 
quoted with approval an opinion of the economist Arthur Lewis in 1954, when 
capital fundamentalism was forming and before the scientific work showing it to be 
misleading had been done, that “the central problem. . . is to understand . . . [how] a 
community which was previously saving and investing 4 or 5 percent of its national 
income or less converts itself into an economy where voluntary saving is running at 
about 12 or 15 percent.”23  I have noted that in an agricultural economy with low 
yield-seed ratios the figure has to be much higher than 4 or 5 percent.  Perhaps 
Lewis meant by “voluntary saving” the saving above “involuntary”—net of 
depreciation, say, and the storing of seed.  But in that case the innovations that made 
physical depreciation lower or that made unnecessary massive “involuntary” saving 
for seed are what explains the modern world, not piling brick on brick.  And 
anyway the Lewis-Feinstein argument would have led to modern economic growth 
23   Feinstein 2003, p. 46.
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in, say, ancient Greece or China, in which savings rates could so easily be driven up 
to 12 or 15 percent: merely force the slaves in the silver mines of Laurion, or the 
workers before they were entombed in the Great Wall, to eat less.  
Capital fundamentalism, in short, has been rejected scientifically, despite 
echoes in the minds of economists who very much want it to be true.  Capital is a 
fine thing to have.  But it is easily gotten by loan when the prospect for innovation is 
large.  Capital is not the constraint, not in the long run.  Smarter, not harder or more 
extensive (and capitalized) work did the modernizing.  Innovation puts smartly into 
practice the idea of a light bulb or of limited liability.  The word “capitalism,” with 
its hidden assumption that piling up frozen labor does the trick, du Plessis notes, 
was applied in the nineteenth century to the system of property rights coordinated 
by prices before we grasped that the innovation encouraged by such a system is 
what chiefly matters.  
Schumpeter defines capitalism variously at various times.  His definition in 
Business Cycles (1939) is "that form of private property economy in which 
innovations are carried out by borrowed money."24  In other words, "we shall date 
capitalism as far back as the element of credit creation," by which he means 
fractional reserve banking—in effect any sort of money storage in which the storer is 
not legally or practically liable to keep all the money on hand all the time.  He notes 
that such institutions existed in the medieval Mediterranean before they existed in 
Northern Europe, and so he would be unsurprised to find business cycles there.  (He 
24   Schumpeter 1939, Vo. I, p. 223.  The next quotation is from p. 224.
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did not realize that Asia had such institutions hundreds of years before.)  He 
claimed in his posthumous History of Economic Analysis that “by the end of the 
fifteenth century most of the phenomena we are in the habit of associating with that 
vague word Capitalism had put in their appearance.”25  And yet it would be three 
more centuries before modernity emerged, economically speaking.  Finance and 
saving and investment cannot have been crucial, or else Florence or Augsburg (or 
Beijing) would have innovated us into the modern world.
Capitalism on Schumpeter’s 1939 definition forms part of a private enterprise 
economy, but there can be private enterprise and innovation without credit and 
therefore without "capitalism."  Note, however, that what is at stake in Schumpeter’s 
argument is the use to which the thrift is put, not its total amount.  Schumpeter said 
it was used for innovation.  Yet even Schumpeter, the inventor of innovation in the 
modern analysis of the economy, allows himself to be tempted by the word 
“capitalism” into discussing finance.  It is not thrifty finance, however, that changed 
everything—as he himself elsewhere agrees.  What changed everything was using 
trust for innovation, Newcomen’s tinkering with atmospheric engines, Rothschild’s 
style of massive arbitrage, Edison’s first generator in Manhattan, Alfred P. Sloan’s 
years at General Motors.
25   Schumpeter 1954, p. 78.
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Chapter 12:
Nor Because of a Rise of Greed or of a Protestant Ethic
Nor does modern innovation have anything unusually “greedy” about it.  In 
characterizing capitalism in 1867 as “solely the restless stirring for gain” Marx said 
he was quoting the bourgeois economist J. R. McCulloch’s Principles of Political  
Economy (edition of 1830): “This inextinguishable passion for gain, the auri sacra 
fames [‘for gold the infamous hunger’], will always lead capitalists.”26  But it leads 
everyone else, too.  Auri sacra fames is from The Aeneid (19 B.C.E.), Book III, line 57, 
not from Benjamin Franklin or Advertising Age.  In 1905 Max Weber, writing when 
the German Romantic notion that medieval society was more sweet and egalitarian 
than the Age of Innovation was just starting to crumble in the face of historical 
research, thundered against such an idea that greed is "in the least identical with 
capitalism, and still less with its spirit."  ”It should be taught in the kindergarten of 
cultural history that this naïve idea of capitalism must be given up once and for all." 
In his posthumous General Economic History (1923) he wrote, "the notion that our 
rationalistic and capitalistic age is characterized by a stronger economic interest than 
other periods is childish."27  The lust for gold, “the impulse to acquisition, pursuit of 
gain, of money, of the greatest possible amount of money, has in itself nothing to do 
26   Quoted in Marx 1867 (Capital, Vol. I, p. 171n2).  I can’t find the phrase in any of the on-line editions of 
McCulloch’s Principles.  Note by the way the use of the word “capitalist,” which occurs in McCulloch over 
100 times (and “capitalism” never).  The Oxford English Dictionary gives Arthur Young’s Travels in France of 
1792 as the first quotation for “capitalist.”  Ricardo used the word little.  The first quotation in the OED for 
“capital” in the economic sense is 1709.
27   Weber 1923, p. 355.
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with innovation.  This [greedy] impulse exists and has existed among waiters, 
physicians, coachmen, artists, prostitutes, dishonest officials, soldiers, nobles, 
crusaders, gamblers, and beggars.  One may say that is has been common to all sorts 
and conditions of men at all times and in all countries of the earth, wherever the 
objective possibility of it is or has been given."28  
People have indulged in the sin of greed, for food or money or fame or 
power, since Eve saw that the tree was to be desired, and took the fruit thereof. 
Soviet Communism massively encouraged the sin of greed, as its survivors testify. 
Medieval peasants accumulated no less “greedily” than do American corporate 
executives, if on a rather smaller scale.  Hume declared in 1742 that “Nor is a porter 
less greedy of money, which he spends on bacon and brandy, than a courtier, who 
purchases champagne and ortolans [little song birds rated a delicacy].  Riches are 
valuable at all times, and to all men.”29  Of course.
Many readers of the magnificent historical Chapters 25-31 of Capital will find 
all this hard to believe.  Marx's eloquence persuades them that someone writing in 
1867, very early in the professionalization of history, nonetheless got the essence of 
the history right.  Another of his great riffs, Chapter 15 on “Machinery and Modern 
Industry” (150 pages in the Modern Library edition of the English translation), 
trumpeted the truth that he was witnessing an Age of Innovation.  But he 
subordinated the tune to his historical harmonizing, the growth of surplus value. 
The history that Marx thought he perceived went with his erroneous logic that 
28   Weber 1905, p. 17.
29   Hume , “Of Refinement in the Arts” ***[1742: “Of Luxury”] in Haakonssen, ed., p. 111.
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capitalism—drawing on an anti-commercial theme as old as commerce—just is the 
same thing as greed.  Greed is the engine that powers his sequence of M à C à M'. 
It says: Money starting through some original theft or thriftiness as an amount M 
gets invested in Capital (commodities used for profit), which is intrinsically 
exploitative (and so amplifies the original theft or thrift), generating surplus value 
appropriated by the capitalist to arrive at a new, higher amount of money, M'.  "We 
have seen how money is changed into capital; how through capital [a] surplus-value 
is made, and from surplus value more capital."  And then again and again and 
again, in the inaccurate English translation of Marx’s German, "endlessly."30  
The classical and Marxist idea that capital begets capital, "endlessly," is hard 
to shake.  Thus Immanuel Wallerstein in 1983 spoke of “the endless accumulation of 
capital, a level of waste that may begin to border on the irreparable.”31  It has 
recently revived a little among economists, in the form of so-called "new growth 
theory," which amounts to giving M à C à M' a mathematically spiffed-up form. 
The "endless"/"never-ending" word, by the way—which was echoed during the 
Dark Ages in rural and monkish economic theory and still resonates in all our 
notions of “capitalism”—originated twenty-four centuries before Marx in the Greek 
aristocratic disdain for commerce.  People of business (declared aristocratic Plato 
and aristocrat-loving Aristotle) are motivated by apeiros, unlimited, greed.  Thus 
Aristotle in the Politics.  The “no limit” in Aristotle is about buying low and selling 
30   For example, Marx 1867, Chp. 24, Sec. 1, p. 641; and Chp. 26, p. 784.
31   Wallerstein 1983 (1995), p. 100.  “Waste” such as decent housing for the Chinese.
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high.32  In the thirteenth century Aquinas, referring to Aristotle with a little less than 
his customary enthusiasm for The Philosopher, retails the usual complaint against 
retailing, which depends on “the greed for gain, which knows no limit and tends to 
infinity.”33  As the political scientist John Danford observes, “the belief that there is 
something objectionable about [arbitrage] has persisted for more than two thousand 
years. . . .  The enduring legacy . . . was. . . the view that . . . commerce or the 
acquisition of wealth is not merely low; it is unnatural, a perversion of nature, and 
unworthy of a decent human being.”34
For all Marx's brilliance—anyone who does not think he was the greatest 
social scientist of the nineteenth century has not read enough Marx, or is blinded by 
ideology or by the unhappy effects of Marxian writings on the politics of the 
twentieth century—he got the history wrong.  Whatever the value of his theories as 
a way of asking historical questions, you cannot rely on Marx for any important 
historical fact: not on enclosures, not on the fate of the workers, not on the results of 
machine production, not on the false consciousness of the working class.  The great 
Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm, for example, a proud member of the Communist 
Party of Great Britain until its dissolution in 1991, admits that the historical 
knowledge of Marx and Engels was on many points “thin.”  No serious Marxist 
historian writing in English, such as Hobsbawm or Christopher Hill or E. P. 
Thompson, has taken historical facts from Marx.35  
32   Aristotle, Politics 1257a20, kai apeiros dê houtos ho ploutos. 
33   Aquinas 1251-1273, Second Part of the Second Part, Question 77, Art. 4, “I answer that.”
34   Danford 2006, pp. 328-329.
35   Hobsbawm 1964, “Introduction” to Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, cited by Pipes 1999, p. 52n.
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It is not some special Marxian fault.  The same is true of the other 
practitioners of merely philosophical history before the facts started at last arriving 
in bulk after the full professionalization of history, during the twentieth century. 
Locke, Hume, Rousseau, Smith, Hegel, Macaulay, Tönnies, Durkheim, and even, a 
late instance, Max Weber on many points, and still later Karl Polanyi (and less 
excusably the many recent followers of Polanyi), got the historical facts more or less 
wrong, and tended to get them wrong in the same way.36  You would be foolish to 
depend mainly on Polanyi or Weber or even my beloved and liberal Macaulay, or 
even my worshipped and liberal Adam Smith, for your understanding of the past. 
The theory of capitalism that educated people to this day carry around in their 
heads springs from the anti-bourgeois rhetoric of Marx, St. Benedict, and Aristotle. 
It is economically mistaken.  And the point here is that it is historically mistaken as 
well.
The myth of Kapitalismus says that thrift among the bourgeoisie consisted 
precisely in the absence of a purpose other than accumulation for its own sake, 
solely the restless stirring for gain.  Declared the man himself in 1867, capitalism 
entails "accumulation for accumulation's sake, production for production's sake." 
"Accumulate, accumulate!  This is Moses and the prophets!"37  Thus the left-wing 
economist, my misled but princely acquaintance the late Robert Heilbroner: 
"capitalism has been an expansive system from its earliest days, a system whose 
36   Santhi Hejeebu and I have laid out the case in favor of Polanyi’s understanding of second best against 
Polanyi's economic history in Hejeebu and McCloskey 2000 and 2003.
37   Marx 1867, Chp. 24, p. 652. 
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driving force has been the effort to accumulate ever larger amounts of capital 
itself."38  Thus Weber, too, in 1905: "the summum bonum of this ethic [is] the earning 
of more and more money. . . .  Acquisition . . . [is] the ultimate purpose of life."39 
Weber here, contrary to his thundering quoted above, retails Marx, money-to-
capital-to-money.  True, skill at acquisition is an “expression of virtue and 
proficiency in a calling.”  But innovation was in historical fact not skill at 
accumulation.  Imagination was not restless stirring for gain.  Socially profitable 
originality was not duty in a calling.  What made us rich was a new rhetoric 
favorable to innovation, imagination, originality—not accumulation restlessly 
stirring, or mere duty to a calling, which are ancient and routine and uncreative, 
though often Good Things.
At the level of individuals there has never been any evidence for the historical 
change that is supposed to characterize modern forms of greedy thrift.  People were 
greedy and thrifty, I repeat, long before.  The chief evidence for a change in 
thriftiness that Weber himself gives in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism 
is a humorless reading of Benjamin Franklin's two-page Advice to a Young Tradesman 
(1748).  He misses for example the deflating sting in the last lines: “He that gets all 
he can honestly, and saves all he gets . . .  will certainly become rich, if that Being 
who governs the world, to whom all should look for a blessing on their honest 
endeavors, doth not, in His wise providence, otherwise determine.”  So nothing is 
38   Heilbroner 1953, p. 201.  Compare p. 156, "an owner-entrepreneur engaged in an endless [apeiros] race," 
and so forth.
39   Weber 1905, p. 53.
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“certainly,” young tradesman, even if you bizarrely save all you get (as Franklin 
assuredly did not).  And he missed in “He that murders a crown, destroys all that it 
might have produced, even scores of pounds” the parodic echo of the previous 
year’s “Speech of Miss Polly Baker.” Avid Franklin readers, of which there were 
many, would have noted the echo.  Prosecuted for giving birth to her fifth 
illegitimate child, Polly as ventriloquised by Franklin chides “the great and growing 
number of bachelors in the country, many of whom, . . . have never sincerely and 
honorably courted a woman in their lives; and by their manner of living leave 
unproduced (which I think is little better than murder) hundreds of their posterity 
to the thousandth generation.  Is not theirs a greater offence against the public good, 
than mine?”  The Yale historian  and editor of the massive Franklin Papers, Claude-
Anne Lopez, once remarked that Franklin will lack an adequate biography until 
someone with a sense of humor attempts it.  
Weber read Franklin’s Autobiography, and like many others he took as the 
man's essence the famous printed account book of virtues that a young printer in 
Philadelphia used to discipline himself.  Declared Weber, “the real Alpha and 
Omega of Franklin’s ethic. . . in all his works without exception” is that expression 
of proficiency in a calling.  No it isn’t.  Like many other readers of Franklin, 
especially non-American readers—most famously D. H. Lawrence in his Studies in  
Classic American Literature (1923)—Weber missed the joke.  Lawrence called Franklin 
“the sharp little man. . . .  The pattern American, this dry, moral, utilitarian little 
democrat,” and other Europeans have viewed him with similarly humorless and 
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uncomprehending scorn. 40  Weber’s nephew wrote a book in 1936 explaining why 
Uncle Max got Franklin so wrong: “Nations are curiously incapable of 
understanding each other’s sense of humor. . . .  [Weber] carefully constructed an 
elaborate theory of Franklin’s ascetic economic ethos as one of the essential 
foundations of modern capitalism, . . . which is repeated uncritically from all kinds 
of pulpits. . . with learned mien and a pronounced shyness to consult the sources.”41 
The frontiersman, wigless, “ascetic” image that Franklin projected for 
political purposes in France was contradicted even there by his actual behavior in 
humorous (and innocent) dalliances with the wives of French aristocrats.  And he 
was nothing like singlemindedly devoted to his calling as a printer and 
businessman, even when before age 42 he was practicing it.  Young and old, 
Franklin was multiminded.  Weber failed to note Franklin's actual behavior as a 
loving and passionate friend and patriot, a deeply curious man very willing to 
wander from his calling to measure the temperature of the Gulf Stream, though 
getting the current job done on time; or his amused self-ironies about his young self. 
Amused self-ironies were a franklinische, and later an American, specialty.  The most 
well-known of the amused self-ironies in Franklin’s Autobiography is his comment 
about a late addition to his checklist of virtues, Humility: "I cannot boast of much 
success in acquiring the reality of this virtue; but I had a good deal with regard to the 
40   Lawrence 1923, p. 23; compare for example Robert Louis Stevenson’s sneer at the teachers of our average 
men, who “from Solomon down to Benjamin Franklin . . . have inculcated the same ideals of manners, 
caution, and respectability” (Stevenson 1881, p. 876).  Even Alasdair MacIntyre, that perceptive Scot 
resident in America, mistakes Franklin.
41   Baumgarten, “Benjamin Franklin: Der Lehrmeister der amerikanischen Revolution,” 1936,  quoted in Roth 
1987, p. 19.  Lujo Brentano, the German economist, whose English (as Roth explains) was much better than 
Weber’s, made the same point.
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appearance of it.”  It is hard miss the nudge in the ribs.  But some people have 
nonetheless missed it, in their eagerness to pillory the bourgeoisie.
Franklin’s writing, when not dead serious (after all, he helped draft the 
Declaration of Independence and the Treaty of Paris), is jammed with such clowning 
around.  In 1741 Poor Richard’s Almanac predicted only sunshine, every day of the 
year.  “To oblige thee more,” Poor Richard explained to his dear reader, “I have 
omitted all the bad weather.”  The parody shouts itself.  Yet many readers of 
Franklin don’t get it—most influentially in his self-parodying compilation of Poor 
Richard’s proverbs, “The Way to Wealth.”  It was published in 1758, when Franklin 
was precisely not pursuing wealth as a printer, or anything else of proficient and 
profitable calling, but representing the Pennsylvania Assembly in London, at his 
own considerable expense, having entirely given up the “duty of the individual to 
increase his capital” that Weber sees in him.  Jill Lapore notes that “The Way to 
Wealth” is “among the most famous pieces of American writing ever, and one of the 
most willfully misunderstood.”  Its thrifty recommendation of “no gains without 
pains” and other supposedly bourgeois formulas “has been taken for Benjamin 
Franklin’s—and even America’s—creed.”42  
Yet only a humorless reading would find in it a sharp little capitalist, a 
pattern American, declaring for Prudence Only.  Mark Van Doren tried in 1938 to 
get people to read Franklin rightly, complaining for example that the “dry, prim 
people” “praise [Franklin’s] thrift.  But he himself admitted that he could never 
42   Lepore 2008, p. 78.
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learn frugality, and he practiced it no longer than his poverty forced him to.” 
Quoting Van Doren, Lapore lists Franklin’s massive purchases in 1758 sent back to 
his wife in Philadelphia.  Franklin attached a proud spender’s notation that “there is 
something from all the china works in England.”43  The misreaders, Van Doren had 
continued, “praise his prudence.  But at seventy he became a leader of a revolution.” 
Lapore points out that most of Poor Richard’s proverbs in the almanacs 
themselves were not in fact about Prudence Only.  Franklin selected the money-
making ones for “The Way to Wealth” because his mission in London was to try to 
persuade the British government to remove some small taxes on their fellow 
countrymen in the colonies.  To his fellow colonists, in line with his optimism that 
with temperance on both sides the Empire could hold together, he was noting in the 
voice of Father Abraham that “the taxes are indeed very heavy. . . but we have many 
others, and much more grievous to some of us.  We are taxed twice as much by 
idleness, three times as much by pride, and four times as much by folly.”  The figure of 
argument was ancient, and nothing like American or utilitarian.  Seneca wrote: 
“Show me a man who isn’t a slave.  One is a slave to sex, another to money, another 
to ambition. . . .  There’s no state of slavery more disgraceful than one that’s self-
imposed.”44  And “Franklin might have chosen to collect,” Lepore notes, “the dozens 
of Poor Richard’s proverbs advising against the accumulation of wealth.  The poor  
have little, beggars none;/ The rich too much, enough not one.”45
43   Lepore 2008, pp. 82, 81.
44   Seneca, Letter XLVII, 17, p. 95, ending nulla servitus turpior est quam voluntaria  . 
45   Lepore 2008, p. 82.
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Lepore agrees with all careful students of Franklin that, as the man himself 
put it, he “would rather have it said, He lived usefully, than, He died rich.”  Greedy 
thrift in the Marxian tale, by contrast, has the sole telos of dying rich.  Charles 
Dickens, brought up in the law in London, who himself was an entrepreneur in 
theatre and publishing but could not understand other profitable trades, gave us 
Scrooge, and his Disney descendant Scrooge McDuck—accumulate, accumulate. 
Max Weber modified the pointlessness of the impulse to accumulate, accumulate by 
claiming that "this philosophy of avarice" (allegedly Franklin’s, remember) depends 
on a transcendent "duty of the individual toward the increase of his capital," yielding 
a "worldly asceticism."46  But Franklin, who after all had lost most other traces of his 
ancestors' Calvinism, whether spiritual or worldly (by contrast with his abstemious 
young friend and enemy John Adams, for example).  He abandoned at age 42 
"endless" accumulation and devoted the other half of his long life to science and 
public purposes, and world-relishing consumption.47  If, as Weber argued, the 
religious element drops out and accumulation takes over, one would like to know 
why accumulation did not take over, in Franklin or in Carnegie or in Gates.  The 
same could be said, and has been by Joel Mokyr, for the rigorous Calvinists of 
seventeenth century Holland—the same ones who spent their incomes on merchant 
palaces along the Singel, and on luscious oil paintings officially warning of the 
vanity of mere matter by showing a polished silver tray with a half peeled lemon 
and a beaker full of the warm south.  So much for “worldly asceticism” or "ever 
46   Weber 1905, p. 51, italics supplied.
47   See the section “Retirement,” pp.126-128 in Isaacson 2003.
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larger amounts of capital itself" or a "duty toward the increase of capital" or 
"accumulate, accumulate."
Many fine scholars have taken in with their mother's milk a belief that 
modern life is unusually devoted to gain, and that thrift is therefore something 
recent, dirty, and bourgeois, though lamentably profitable—because of exploitation 
in M à C à M’.  "The unlimited hope for gain in the market," writes the otherwise 
admirable political theorist Joan Tronto, "would teach people an unworkable 
premise for moral conduct, since the very nature of morality seems to dictate that 
desires must be limited by the need to coexist with others."48  But running a business, 
unlike professing at a university, would teach anyone that gain is limited.  Dealing 
in a market, unlike sitting in the Reading Room of the British Museum during the 
1850s and 1860s writing burning phrases against the market, would teach that 
desires must be limited by the need to coexist with others.  The tuition of a market 
society in scarcity, other-regarding, and liberal values works as an ethical school.  As 
the historian Thomas Haskell put it in 1985, "contrary to romantic folklore, the 
marketplace is not a Hobbesian war of all against all.  Many holds are barred. 
Success ordinarily requires not only pugnacity and shrewdness but also restraint," 
that is, the virtue of temperance.49
Even so fine an historian as Alan Macfarlane believes the Aristotelian 
/Marxist/ Weberian lore: "the ethic of endless accumulation," he writes, "as an end 
48   Tronto 1993, p. 29.
49   Haskell's remark is quoted in Innis 1988, p. 39n61.
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and not a means, is the central peculiarity of capitalism."50  If it were, the miser 
would be a strictly modern figure, and not proverbial in every literature in the 
world.  Around 1665 the poet Abraham Cowley (a royalist version of Milton) wrote 
of avarice that “there is no vice that has been so pelted with good sentences, and 
especially by the poets, who have . . . moved, as we say, every stone to fling at it,” 
and gave an example from his own pen: 
What would content you?  who can tell?
Ye fear so much to lose what ye have got
As if ye lik’d it well,
Ye strive for more as if lik’d it not.
He translates Horace to the same effect, and quotes a line he attributes to Ovid: 
Desunt luxuriae multa avaritiae omnia (Many things are wanting to Luxury, [but] 
everything to Avarice).51  As Cowley implies, however, go anywhere in literature or 
preaching or law from Mesopotamia to the moderns and you will find similar 
sentiments about the avaricious miser—who is supposed in modernist theorizing to 
arise suddenly around 1750 out of Calvinist ancestry in the form of the sharp little 
man, this dry, moral, utilitarian little democrat.  In China the poet Tang Bo Ju-yi 
(772-846 C.E.) complains of the salt-tax monopolist that “The salt merchant’s wife/ 
has silk and gold aplenty,/ but she does not work at farming [the only honored 
source of things],/. . . .  Her gleaming wrists have gotten plump,/ Her silver 
50   Macfarlane 1987, p. 226.
51   Cowley c. 1665, pp. 198, 197.  The Horace is the First Satire (beginning “How comes it to pass, Maecenas, 
that no one lives content with his condition?”), but the Ovid is actually Publilius Syrus, maxim 121, with 
inopiae, “to poverty,” substituted for luxuriae, (www.thelatinlibrary.com/syrus.html), and was quoted in 
Seneca. 
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bracelets tight."  Or Liu Zong-yuan (773-819 C.E.), in a parable comparing the miser 
to a pack beetle: “Those in our own times who lust to lay hold of things will never 
back away when they chance on possessions by which to enrich their household 
[just like the beetle carrying whatever useful he encounters twice his weight on his 
back].  They don’t understand that it encumbers them, and fear only that they won’t 
accumulate enough.”52  
“In this consists the difference between the character of a miser," wrote Adam 
Smith in 1759, "and that of a [thrifty] person of exact economy and assiduity.  The 
one is anxious about small matters for their own sake; the other attends to them only 
in consequence of the scheme of life which he has laid down for himself."53  He 
might as well have been describing Ben Franklin before he was wealthy, or his 
friend Mr. William Crauford, a merchant of Glasgow, whom he did describe in 1758: 
“Who to that exact frugality, that downright probity and plainness of manners so 
suitable to his profession, joined a love of learning, . . an openness of hand and a 
generosity of heart. . . .  candid and penetrating, circumspect and sincere.”54 
Accumulate, accumulate, or plumping ones wrists, or laying hold of everything like 
a pack beetle, is not a "scheme of life" in the ethical sense that Smith had in mind.  
At the level of the society as a whole there is "unlimited" accumulation, at any 
rate if rats and fire and war do not intervene.  Corporations are streams of such 
accumulation, having legally infinite lives—though in truth many little corporations 
52   From Owen 1996, pp. 501, 617-618.
53   Smith 1759 (1790), III.6.6, p. 173.
54   Smith, Essays on Philosophical Subjects, p. 262.  
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die every year, and a few big ones (thus Lehman Brothers, Washington Mutual, 
WorldCom, and General Motors).55  The individual economic molecules who make 
up the river of innovation may not always want to accumulate, accumulate beyond 
age 42, but the river as a whole, it is said, keeps rolling along.  It is true, and to our 
good.  The books and machines and improved acreage and splendid buildings and 
so forth inherited from an accumulating past are good for us now.  Thanks be to the 
ancestors.
But there is no historical case for "accumulate, accumulate" being peculiar to 
modern times.  Crassus and Seneca accumulated.  The presence of old buildings is 
not historically recent, suddenly accumulated in the Age of Innovation.  Very long-
lived institutions like families or churches or royal lineages existed before 1700, and 
were themselves, too, sites of accumulation.  Thus the long-lived improved acreage 
could spread up the hillsides under the pressure of population before the Black 
Death.  Thus the long-lived medieval cathedrals were raised over centuries.  Thus 
the long-lived Oxford colleges were built, and endowed with long-lived real estate, 
itself the accumulated investment in long-lived drains and stone fences and brick 
barns.  Thus the canals of China and the roads of Peru.
 The classical economists from Adam Smith to Marx were writing before the 
upsurge in real wages of British and French and American working people in the 
last half of the nineteenth century, and long before the explosion of world income in 
55   Lex Donaldson (1995, p. 75), following Alfred Chandler, argues that of the largest American corporations 
only 2  percent vanish every year, and few of these from closing down—they get merged instead.  But those 
are the big boys, too big to fail.  Siegel (2002, p. 638, Fig. 14-1) reckons that all U.S. enterprises with any sort 
of payroll, not merely the big ones, have death rates of about 17 percent in each of their first couple of years, 
decreasing to 7 percent per year if they survive to age 14.
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the twentieth century.  They imagined a moderate rise of income per person, 
perhaps at the most by a factor of two or three, such as might conceivably be 
achieved by Scotland's Highlands becoming similar to capital-rich Holland (Smith's 
view) or by manufacturers in Manchester stealing savings for reinvestment from 
their poor workers (Marx's view) or by the savings generated from globalization 
being invested in European factories (John Stuart Mill's view).  (To speak again to 
my economist colleagues, they contemplated moving down the marginal product of 
capital—not its shocking lurch to the right.)  But the classical economists, to repeat, 
were mistaken.
The prehistory of thrift was revolutionized around 1960 when economists 
and economic historians realized with a jolt that thriftiness and savings could not 
explain the Industrial Revolution.  The economists such as Abramowitz, Kendrick, 
and Solow discovered that only a smallish fraction even of recent economic growth 
can be explained by routine thrift and miserly accumulation.  At the same time the 
economic historians were bringing the news that in Britain the rise in savings was 
too modest to explain much at all.  Simon Kuznets and later many other economists 
such as Charles Feinstein provided the rigorous accounting of the fact—though as 
students of capital accumulation they could never quite overcome their initial 
hypothesis that Capital Did The Trick.  The aggregate statistical news was 
anticipated in the 1950s and 1960s by numerous economic historians of Britain such 
as François Crouzet and Philip Cottrell and Sidney Pollard, in detailed studies of the 
financing of industry.  Peter Mathias summarized the case in 1973: "considerable 
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revaluation has recently occurred in assessing the role of capital."56  That is no 
overstatement.  
The trouble is that savings and urbanization and state power to expropriate 
and the other physical-capital accumulations that are supposed to explain modern 
economic growth have existed on a large scale since the Sumerians.  Yet modern 
economic growth—that wholly unprecedented factor in the high teens (or low 
hundreds if quality of goods is measured properly)—is a phenomenon of the past 
two centuries alone.  Something happened in the eighteenth century that prepared 
for a temporary but shocking "great divergence" of the European economies from 
those of the rest of the world.
The classical and flawed view, overturned by the economic historians of the 
1950s and 1960s, is that thrift implies saving which implies capital accumulation 
which implies modern economic growth.  It lingered in a few works such as Walt 
Rostow's The Stages of Economic Growth (1960), and most unhappily in what Easterly 
called the capital fundamentalism of foreign aid, 1950 to the present.  The belief was 
that if we give Ghana over several decades large amounts of savings, leading to 
massive capital investments in artificial lakes and Swiss bank accounts, and give 
Communist China not a cent, Ghana will prosper and Communist China will 
languish.57  Inevitably.  The mathematics on the blackboard says so.  
56   Mathias 1973 (1979), p. 88.
57   Rostow 1960; Easterly 2001.
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Chapter 13:
Nor Because of Original Accumulation
Of course, if you think up a waterpower-driven spinning machine, as both 
the Chinese and the British did, you need some thrifty savings somehow 
accumulated to bring the thought to fruition.  But another of the discoveries of the 
1960s by economic historians was that the savings required in England's heroic age 
of mechanization were modest indeed, nothing like the eventually massive offspring 
of the "original accumulation of capital" that Marxist theory posits.  Early cotton 
factories were not capital-intensive.  Even in the 1830s, as François Crouzet noted, 
the percentage of all capital “sunk into fixed assets. . . was indeed small (25 percent, 
20percent or less) even in the most ‘capital intensive’ firms.”58  The source of the 
industrial investment required was short-term loans from merchants for inventories 
and longer-term loans from relatives—not savings ripped in great chunks from 
other parts of the economy.  Such chunk-ripping “capitalism” awaited the Railway 
Age.
The marxisant analysis is that what happened earlier was the original 
accumulation of capital.  The original or primitive accumulation was according to 
Marx the seed corn, so to speak, or better the starter in the sourdough, in the growth 
of capital.  We're back to thrift or savings, not by historical fact but by blackboard 
logic.  "The whole movement," Marx reasoned, "seems to turn on a vicious circle, out 
58   Crouzet 1985, p. 9.
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of which we can only get by supposing a primitive accumulation, . . . an 
accumulation not the result of the capitalist mode of production, but its starting 
point."59  The reasoning sounds plausible.  It appeals, like Malthusian predictions of 
limits, to a mathematics.  But it didn’t happen.  As the economic historian Alexander 
Gerschenkron put it in 1957, with characteristic sarcasm, the primitive or original 
starting point is "an accumulation of capital continuing over long historical periods
—over several centuries—until one day the tocsin of the Industrial Revolution was 
to summon it to the battlefields of factory construction."60
Marx's notion in Capital was that an original accumulation was a sine qua non, 
and had nothing to do with “that queer saint . . . of the woeful countenance, the 
capitalist 'abstainer'.”  There was no saintliness about it.  The original accumulation 
was necessary (Marx averred) because masses of savings were necessary, and 
"conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, briefly, force, play the greater part."61  He 
instanced enclosure in England during the sixteenth century (which has been 
overturned by historical findings that such enclosure was economically minor) and 
in the eighteenth (which has been overturned by findings that the labor driven off 
the land by enclosure was a tiny source of the industrial proletariat, and enclosure 
happened then mainly in the south and east where in fact little of the new sort of 
industrialization was going on).62  He gave a large part then to regulation of wages 
in creating a proletariat for the first time in the sixteenth century (which has been 
59   Marx 1867, p. 784.
60   Gerschenkron 1957 (1962), p. 33.
61   Marx 1867, p. 785.
62   McCloskey 1975a, and works cited there.
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overturned by findings that nearly half of the labor force in England as early as the 
thirteenth century already worked for wages; and that attempts to control the labor 
market did not work).63  And then to the slave trade: "Liverpool waxed fat on the 
slave-trade.  This was its method of primitive accumulation" (which has been 
overturned by findings that the alleged profits were no massive fund).64  Later 
writers have proposed as the source of the original accumulation the exploitation by 
the core of the periphery (Poland, the New World).65  Or the influx of gold and silver 
from the New World—strange as it is then that imperial Iberia did not industrialize. 
Or the exploitation of workers themselves during the Industrial Revolution, out of 
sequence.  Or other loot from imperialisms old and new, too small to matter much, 
and also too late.  Or, following on Marx and Engels’ assertion in the Manifesto, even 
seventeenth-century piracy, tiny impositions on the flow of Spanish treasure by 
Sephardim venturing from Jamaica and runaway slaves from Hispaniola.66
None of these, it has been found, makes very much historical sense.  If they 
happened at all, they are too small to explain what is to be explained.  Such 
historical findings are in truth not very surprising.  After all, conquest, enslavement, 
robbery, murder—briefly, violence—has characterized the sad annals of humankind 
since Cain and Abel.  Why did not earlier and even more thorough expropriations 
result in an industrial revolution and a factor of sixteen or twenty or one-hundred in 
63   Postan 1966, p. 622, that “in order to subsist an average smallholder [more than one half of the population 
in a sample of 104 manors in southern England] had to supplement his income in other ways.”  Postan was 
not optimistic that all would get wage work, but from the hiring side he inferred that many did (p. 623).
64   Marx 1867, p. 833.
65   Wallerstein 1974.
66   Kritzler 2008.
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the widened scope of the average Briton or American or Taiwanese?  Something 
besides thrifty self-discipline or violent expropriation must have been at work in 
northwestern Europe and its offshoots in the eighteenth century and later.  Self-
discipline and expropriation have been too common in human history to explain a 
Revolution gathering force in Europe around 1800.
And as a practical matter a pile of physical capital financed from, say, Piet 
Heyn's seizure of the Spanish treasure fleet in 1628 would by the year 1800 melt 
away to nothing.  It does not accumulate.  It depreciates.  And as Gerschenkron 
noted, “why should a long period of capital accumulation precede the period of rapid 
industrialization?  Why is not the capital as it is being accumulated also invested in 
industrial ventures?”67  Why not indeed.  In the story of original accumulation the 
clever capitalists are supposed to let their capital lie idle for centuries until the 
“tocsin” sounds.
People seem to be mixing up financial wealth and real wealth.  Financial 
wealth in a bank account is merely a paper claim to the society's real wealth by this 
person against that person.   The society's real wealth itself, on the other, is a house 
or ship or education.  From the point of view of the society as a whole the real 
wealth is what’s needed for real investment, not paper claims or gold coins.  The 
paper claims are merely ways of keeping track of who owns the returns to the 
capital.  They are not the real capital itself.  You can't build a factory with pound 
notes, or dig a canal with bank accounts.  You need bricks and wheelbarrows, and 
67   Gerschenkron 1957 (1962), p. 34.
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people skilled to wield them.  Mere financing or ownership can hardly be the crux, 
or else the Catholic Church in 1300, with its dominate command of tokens of wealth, 
would have created an industrial society.  Or the Philips II, III, and IV of Spain—
who after all were the principal beneficiaries of the treasure fleets the English and 
Dutch privateers preyed upon—would have financed industrial revolutions in 
Bilboa and Barcelona instead of obstructing them.  
Any original accumulation supposed to be useful to any real industrialization 
must be available in real things.  But as the Koran says, "what you possess [in real, 
physical things] will pass, but what is with God will abide" (16:96).  "These lovely 
[earthly] things," wrote St. Augustine, "go their way and are no more. . . .  In them is 
no repose, because they do not abide."68  A real house made in 1628 out of Piet's 
profit from robbing Spain would be tumbled down by 1800, unless in the meantime 
its occupants had continued to invest in it.  A real educated person of 1628 would be 
long dead, a real machine would be obsolete, a real book would be eaten by worms. 
The force of depreciation makes an original accumulation spontaneously disappear.
This is not to say, note well again, that conquest, enslavement, robbery, and 
murder play no part in European history.  A Panglossian assumption that contract, 
not violence, explains, say, the relation between lord and peasant defaces the recent 
work on "new" institutionalism, such as that of Douglass North.69  Yet, pace Marx, 
modern economic growth did not and does not and cannot depend on the scraps to 
be gained by stealing from poor people.  It is not a good business plan: it never has 
68   Augustine, Confessions, 398 AD, IV, x.
69   See Ogilvie's devastating empirical inquiry Ogilvie, 2004 into such Panglossian hypotheses.
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been, or else industrialization would have happened when Pharaoh stole labor from 
the Hebrew slaves.  Stealing from poor people, when you think about it, could 
hardly explain enrichment by a factor of sixteen, not speak of one hundred.  Would 
you do so well by robbing the homeless people in your neighborhood, or by 
breaking into the home of the average factory worker?  Would grabbing stuff from 
the poor of the world enrich the average person in the world, including those poor 
victims themselves, by a factor of ten since 1800?  Does it strike you as plausible that 
British national income depended on stealing from an impoverished India?  If so, 
you will need to explain why real income per head in Britain went up sharply in the 
decade after Britain "lost" India, and so too for all the imperial powers after 1945: 
France, Holland, Belgium, and at length even Portugal. 
Modern economic growth has not depended on saving, and therefore has not 
depended on stealing to get the saving, or any other form of original accumulation, 
even the peaceful practice of the knights of the woeful countenance abstaining from 
consumption.  Turgot and Smith and Mill and Marx and the new growth theorists 
among the economists, all of whom emphasize capital accumulation, get the story 
quite wrong.  That the oldsters got it so wrong is unsurprisingly considering the 
stately pace at which the economies they were looking at were improving, at least 
by contrast with the frenetic pace after 1848 and especially after 1948, and most 
especially after 1978.  (The youngsters of the new growth theories have no such 
excuse; they should have learned by now that modern economic growth is unique.) 
The early economists had a notion of modest modernization to the level of, say, the 
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prosperous Netherlands in 1776, easily achievable by peace and routine investment, 
not a transformation to a level of suburban America in 2010, achievable only by a 
rate of innovation each year such as had never happened before.  "All the authors 
[who] followed the Turgot-Smith line," wrote Schumpeter as the frenzy was 
becoming apparent, "[were] at fault in believing that thrift was the all-important 
[causal] factor."70  Most savings for innovation, Schumpeter had noted twenty years 
earlier, "does not come from thrift in the strict sense, that is from abstaining from 
consumption. . . but [from] funds which are themselves the result of successful 
innovation" (in the language of accounting, "retained earnings").71  The money for 
the few massive and capital-intensive innovations such as railways, he argues, 
comes from banks using "money creation."  (The mysterious phrase “money 
creation” means simply the loans beyond the gold or dollars in their vaults that 
venturing bankers can make, on the hopeful supposition that not everyone will want 
their gold or dollars back at the same time.  In a word, it is credit.)  
But Schumpeter did not fully appreciate that even in the twentieth century of 
wide markets and big laboratories a company can expand without massive loans, 
rather in the way that the first innovations of the Industrial Revolution relied on 
retained earnings, trade credit, and modest loans from cousins and scriveners and 
solicitors.  The big public offerings required 1840-1940 by capital-intensive industries 
such as railways, steel, chemicals, automobiles, electricity generation, and oil 
exploration and refining were unique.  Economics as a science grew up in the Age of 
70   Schumpeter 1954, p. 572n2.  
71   Schumpeter 1926 [1934], p. 72.
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Capital (as the historian Eric Hobsbawm called it).  Naturally the economists such as 
Mill or Marx or Marshall became obsessed with physical accumulation.  But as 
Hobsbawm and other historical materialists who have long lamented the dominion 
of capital do not sufficiently appreciate (though employed in the industry supplying 
education), 1840-1940 became an age increasingly of human capital.  By now in rich 
countries the returns to human capital account for a much higher share of national 
income than do the returns to the land and especially to the machinery that so 
exercised the very first generation of economic historians—Marx, Arnold Toynbee 
(uncle of the historian of universal history), and their contemporaries.
  *      *      *      *
But human capital without the Revaluation of bourgeois innovation would 
have piled up merely another item in the Age of Capital, and would now give no 
persuasive explanation of enrichment.  The economic historian David Mitch, the 
doyen of the educational historians of Britain, has shown that education of the 
masses played a small role in the early stages of the Industrial Revolution. 
“England, during its Industrial Revolution 1780 to 1840, experienced a notable 
acceleration in economic growth yet displayed little evidence of improvement in the 
educational attainments of its workforce.”72  Granted, a wholly illiterate country 
could hardly have taken advantage of the steam engine in the way the British did. 
Mitch makes the point with a hilarious counterfactual (intentional hilarity being not 
72   Mitch 2003, p. 6; and Mitch 1992, 1999, 2003, 2004.  Compare West 1978.
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all that common in economic history) in which he imagines switching the 
populations of Britain and the Eskimo far north.73  
By contrast, Richard Easterlin has answered the question “Why isn’t the 
whole world developed?” by pointing to “the extent of [a] population’s formal 
schooling.”  The difference between the two writers can be explained by the periods 
that Mitch and Easterlin are studying.  Lately human capital has become indubitably 
important.  But around 1840 it’s hard to make the case that it was important for coal 
miners or cotton mill workers.  Easterlin points out that the spread of technology is 
personal, in just the sense that the chemist and philosopher Michael Polanyi used 
the word in his book Personal Knowledge (1958), and quotes the economist Kenneth 
Arrow: “it seems to be personal contact that is most relevant in leading to. . . 
adoption” of a technique.74  Technical knowledge is largely tacit, non-write-
downable, and requires people quick on the uptake.  Quickness of uptake—most 
relevant to recent years in which the technology to be taken up is so ample—can be 
encouraged by literacy.
But it can also be discouraged by literacy, leading to a rote-learning 
bureaucracy hostile to innovation.  And if by itself teaching many more people to 
read was good for the economy, as it surely has been recently, it must be explained 
why Greek potters around 600 B.C.E. signing their amphora did not come to use 
water power to run their wheels and thence to ride on railways to Delphi behind 
puffing locomotive.  And if not in 600 B.C.E, then why not later in the long history of 
73   Mitch 2004, p. 6. 
74   Arrow 1969, quoted in Easterlin 2004, p. 61.
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the unusually literate Greeks?  Easterlin in fact agrees, noting that high educational 
attainment in Spain early on was offset by the rigid (and anti-bourgeois) control by 
the post-Reformation Church.75
Education can make people free without making them rich.  The historian 
George Huppert has told of the invention of widespread education in Europe from 
the sixteenth-century on.76  The secular “grammar” schools prepared young men for 
careers in the clerisy, such as Huppert’s hero the naturalist Pierre Belon (1517-1564), 
or Pierre Ramus (1515-1572), the Huguenot reformer and underminer of the 
medieval rhetorical tradition.  The mushrooming merchant academies had a more 
practical curriculum than the grammar schools, seeking bourgeois and thrifty ways 
of making and doing things.  In France especially, Huppert argues, education down 
to the level of village schools for peasants became a passion in the sixteenth century, 
and a worry for the Church: “even in the smallest towns of the kingdom,” a priest 
wrote, “merchants and even peasants find ways of getting their children to abandon 
trade and farming in favor of the professions.”77
Yet education without the new bourgeois rhetoric is merely a desirable 
human ornament, not the way to human riches.  It makes for a clerisy that may in 
fact be hostile to bourgeois values, and very willing to become serviceable to the 
anti-economic projects of the emperor or the lord bishop.  “For two centuries,” 
wrote Mill in 1845, “the Scottish peasant, compared with the same class in other 
75   Easterlin 2004, pp. 67-68.
76   Huppert 1977, 1999.
77   Huppert 1999, p. 100. 
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situations, has been a reflecting, an observing, and therefore naturally a self-
governing, a moral, and a successful human being—because he has been a reading 
and a discussing one; and this he owes, above all other causes, to the parish schools. 
What during the same period have the English peasantry been?”78  Yet the superior 
education, right up to the notable superiority of Scottish and German over English 
and French universities in the eighteenth century, did not make Scottish or German 
economic growth superior to English, or for that matter French.  Education proved 
to be of little use without the liberal rhetoric that made innovation possible.  
The economic historian Lars Sandberg spoke of Sweden as “the impoverished 
sophisticate”: in 1800, though among the poorest countries in Europe, Swedes read 
at least the Good Book, because Luther had demanded it, and indeed Sweden 
boasted in Uppsala one of the oldest universities in Europe.  In the late nineteenth 
and especially in the twentieth century Sweden could take advantage of its literacy, 
and there is no doubt that education does matter mightily to its standing now as one 
of the richest countries in the world.79  But without a liberalized attitude towards 
innovation, such sophisticates would have kept their country impoverished.  The 
educated Chinese elite did.  The educated Spanish elite did.  The Afrikaners during 
the nineteenth century were, as Calvinists, supposed to become literate enough to 
read the Bible.  Many in fact didn’t, until the reforms of Afrikaner education after 
78   Mill 1845.
79   Sandberg 1979.
49
1900, which was accompanied by a self-conscious attempt to adopt pro-innovation 
views formerly disdained.80  
The truth remains that education by itself does not yield much.  Cubans 
nowadays go to school, if strictly limited in what they are permitted to read (a 
bookstore in Havana has the usual books on technical subjects like engineering; but 
in history or the social sciences it has nothing beyond the Marxist-Leninist 
orthodoxy).  Yet Cubans cannot start a restaurant or take their farm produce to 
markets, and so they remain cripplingly poor because they are disabled from 
exercising bourgeois virtues—in sharp contrast to their cousins in Miami.  Cuba’s 
income per head by 2001 was still about what it had been in 1958, while all around it 
since the Revolution income per head had almost doubled.81  You will say, “But 
Cubans as you admit are educated, and well cared for in their hospitals.”  Yet so 
they were before 1959, too, by the standards of those days.  And yet they fled after 
1959 to Miami.  The sociologists Victor Nee and Richard Swedberg note that in 
recent decades China, which had ruined its educational system in the Great Leap 
Forward, has grown vigorously, while Russia, which led the world in education 
during the communist period, and which in some ways still does, yet is notably 
lacking in the toleration for bourgeois innovation that China has developed, did not 
grow except when oil prices were high.82  Specialize in ping pong and sending 
80   Gilomee 2003, pp. 210-212, 319, 371, 405-406.  Olive Schreiner wrote a novel about Afrikaner farm life in 
the 1860s.  Her character the Afrikaner Tant’ [Aunt] Sannie declares, “Didn’t the minister tell me when I 
was confirmed not to read any book except my Bible and hymn-book, that the Devil was in all the rest?” 
(Schreiner 1883, p. 113).  There was some doubt that Tant’ Sannie could read much even of these.
81   Maddison 2006, p. 525.
82   Nee and Swedberg 2007, p. 3.
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professors to re-education camps, like the Chinese, and prosper.  Win chess matches 
and lead the world in certain fields of mathematics, like the Russians, and stagnate.
   *       *       *       * 
"Capitalist production," Marx declared, "presupposes the pre-existence of 
considerable masses of capital."83  No it doesn't.  A modest stream of withheld 
profits will pay for repairing the machines and acquiring new ones, especially the 
uncomplicated machines of 1760, and now again the complicated but capital-cheap 
machines of the computer age.  In 1760 the most complicated European "machine" in 
existence was a first-rate ship of the line, itself continuously under repair.  Even then 
Chinese junks were better ships, with such innovations as watertight compartments 
to prevent sinking, and in their heyday they were gigantically larger than European 
sailing ships—in the fifteenth century 600 feet in length, as again the pathetic 98 feet 
of Columbus’ Santa Maria.  But the “Ming Ban” on ocean-going trade after 1433 
effectively stopped the building and use of big ships for the very long-distance trade 
in which the Europeans a little later came to delight.  Had the Emperor and his 
successors continued the (highly unprofitable) trade beyond southeast Asia and 
India, and had Europe not come to admire bourgeois life and innovation, by now all 
of North and South America, and much of Africa, would be speaking Chinese, and 
wondering why the Europeans had been slow to industrialize.  And so far as the 
origin of capitalist production is concerned, the “masses” of capital could be in 1760 
83   Marx 1867,  p. 794.
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modest in magnitude—again the starter in sourdough bread—and could come from 
small change anywhere, not only from some great original sin of primitive 
accumulation.  
The conviction that innovation was born in sin, though, has proven hard to 
shake.  It gets its staying power from guilt meeting zero sum.  We are rich.  Surely 
we got so by stealing.  As the Master himself put it, “primitive accumulation plays in 
Political Economy about the same part as original sin in theology.”84  Most 
intellectuals, who do not grasp the productivity of cooperation in markets or 
especially the productivity of creative destruction, take such illogic as a known fact. 
The historian Louis Dupré pauses in his recent survey of the French Enlightenment 
to gesture towards the quite different Enlightenment going on in Scotland at the 
time.  He commends Smith for “a genuine concern for the fate of the workers,” but 
then asserts as though we all know it to be true that “an unrestricted market 
economy could not but render their lot very harsh, especially during the early 
period of industrial innovation when accumulation of capital was largely to be 
earned at their expense.”85  Not surprisingly, Dupré offers no evidence for such an 
obvious truth.  It is part of our intellectual upbringing, not something requiring 
evidence—that accumulation is the key to growth and that accumulation depends 
on the sacrifice of workers.  Thus Sellar and Yeatman in their spoof of English 
history, 1066 and All That (1931), describe “the Industrial Revelation” as the most 
memorable of the discoveries made around 1800, namely, “the discovery (made by 
84   Marx 1867, Chp. xxvi, p. 784.
85   Dupré 2004, p. 178.
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all the rich men in England at once) that women and children could work for 25 
hours a day in factories without many of them dying or becoming excessively 
deformed.”86  Most educated people believe such a history is approximately correct, 
and credit Charles Dickens as an accurate reporter on industrialization.  Dickens 
seldom ventured north of London, knew nothing of industrialization, and spoke 
instead of poverty of a traditional sort in London itself, which he viewed from a 
perch in the bourgeoisie.  The claim that immiserization is inevitable, a God-given 
equilibrium short of the Second Coming, arises from Malthus in 1798, reaffirmed by 
The Communist Manifesto in 1848, and comes more deeply from a Christian 
embarrassment of riches.  
But economic historians have shown original accumulation to be mistaken on 
both counts.  Accumulation was not the key, and sacrificing the workers was not 
how the accumulation that did happen was achieved.  Workers in industrial areas of 
Britain were to be sure wretchedly poor.  But so were Dickens’ London poor.  And 
so was every ordinary person in the world in those times before the greater day of 
the bourgeoisie and invention and innovation—all of our ancestors lived on that 
miserable $3.00.  True, children worked.  But they always had, and late-nineteenth 
century industrialization reduced rather than increased their number picking coal or 
retying broken yarn.  Factory work was seen by the children themselves as better 
than farm work.87  Wages rose relatively in the industrial areas of England or 
Scotland or Belgium, despite a rising population overall and the weight of the 
86   Sellar and Yeatman 1931, p. 92-93.
87   Honeyman 2007.
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Napoleonic struggle.  The coal miners and cotton mill workers were notably better 
off than their country cousins, which is why the industrial workers left the farms in 
the first place.  Innovation, as many have noted since Friedrich Hayek and Max 
Hartwell and Thomas Ashton spoke out in the 1950s against the Fabian socialist 
version of British history, was not born in a sin of expropriation.88 
What did not happen in any case, I’ve noted, was a big rise in European thrift. 
Nothing much changed from 1348-1700 or from 1700 to 1848 in the actual 
circumstances of thriftiness.  And the modest changes did not matter much. 
Individual Dutch and English speaking people who initiated the modern world did 
often practice personal thrift—or often did not; as they still do, or do not.  Look at 
your improvident cousin with a $20,000 of credit-card debt, or on the other side 
your miserly neighbor.  And changes in aggregate rates of saving drove nothing of 
consequence.  No unusual Weberian ethic of high thriftiness or Marxian anti-ethic of 
forceful expropriation started economic growth.  East Anglian Puritans learned from 
their Dutch neighbors and co-religionists how to be thrifty in order to be godly, to 
work hard in order, as John Winthrop put it, "to entertain each other in brotherly 
affection.”89   That’s lovely, but it’s not what caused industrialization—as indeed one 
can see from the delay of modern (as against early-modern) industrialization even in 
the Protestant and prosperous parts of the Low Countries, or for that matter in East 
Anglia.  
88   Hayek, ed. 1954; Hartwell  1961; for the pessimistic case, see Hobsbawm 1957.
89   Winthrop quoted in Innes, "Puritanism and Capitalism," 1994, p. 106.
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The habits of thriftiness and luxury and profit, and the routines of 
exploitation, are humanly ordinary, and largely unchanging.  A surprising support 
for such a point comes from a follower of Karl Polanyi: "There are always and 
everywhere potential surpluses available.  What counts is the institutional means for 
bringing them to life. . . . for calling forth the special effort, setting aside the extra 
amount, dividing the surplus."90  As the theologian and social observer Michael 
Novak puts it, “Weber stressed asceticism and grind; the heart of the system is 
actually creativity.”91  That’s what was new.  Modern economic growth depends on 
applied innovation in crafting gadgets (organizational and intellectual gadgets such 
as law partnerships and the calculus as much as physical ones), what the 
philosopher Whitehead called the invention of invention.  The invention of 
invention appears in turn to depend on bourgeois dignity and liberty—at any rate 
when the ingenious gadgets were first invented, not merely borrowed, as later the 
USSR and the People’s Republic of China were able to do (though sluggishly when 
under central planning).  “We doubt not,” wrote a pamphleteer against machine-
breaking in 1675, “but innovation will find encouragement in England.”92  And so it 
did. 
There are many tales told about the pre-history of thrift.  The central tales are 
Marxist or Weberian or now growth-theory-ish.  They are misled.  Accumulation 
has not been the heart of modern economic growth, or of the change from the 
90   Pearson, p. 339, quoted in Hirschman 1958 (1988), p. 5n11.
91   Novak 2007, p. 227.
92   Earle 1989, p. 337, quoting in turn Wadsworth and Mann 1931, p. 103.
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medieval to the early-modern economy, or from the early-modern to the fully 
modern economy.  It has been a necessary medium, but easily supplied, like 
Shakespeare’s alphabet.  The substance has been innovation.  If you personally wish 
to grow a little rich, by all means be thrifty, and thereby accumulate for retirement. 
But a much better bet is to have a good idea and be the first to invest in it.  And if 
you wish your society to be rich you should urge an acceptance of creative 
destruction and an honoring of wealth obtained honestly by innovation.  You 
should not urge thrift, not much.  (Nor should you recommend sheer wealth 
acquired by stealing, such as the program of making a “middle class” in certain 
African countries by enriching the state bureaucrats in the main cities at the expense 
of farmers.93)  You should work for your society to be free, and thereby open to new 
ideas, and thereby educable and ingenious.  You should try to persuade people to 
admire properly balanced bourgeois virtues, without worshipping them.  Your 
society will thereby become very, very rich.  American society nowadays is notably 
unthrifty.  The fact is much lamented by modern puritans left and right.  But 
because the United States accepts innovation and because it honors Warren Buffett, 
it will continue to be rich, in frozen pizzas and in artistic creativity and in scope for 
the average person.  
“Thrift” has been much praised in American civic theology.  “Work hard, 
follow the rules,” say the American politicians: “Anyone can achieve the American 
Dream.”  No, sadly, they cannot.  But like many other of the sacred words, such as 
93   Schultz 1964 and Bates 1981.
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"democracy" or "equality" or "opportunity" or "progress," the rhetoric of thrift and 
hard work and following the rules turns out to be more weighty than its material 
force.  Time for the old tale of thriftiness to be retired, and a new history of 
innovation to replace it.
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